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 1 Introduction
For many years, the eld of entrepreneurship has followed an approach that focused on
the single entrepreneur as the driver of the venture creation process (Kamm et al., 1990;
Gartner et al., 1994). He, or she, was regarded as: "the lone hero, battling against the
storms of economic, government, social, and other environmental forces before anchoring
in the harbour of success" (Cooney, 2005, p. 226), despite the fact that entrepreneurship
in many aspects is a social activity (Ruef et al., 2003). From this social perspective, many
studies started to treat entrepreneurship as a collective activity and pushed the "myth of
the lone hero" to the background (Kamm et al., 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990;
Gartner et al., 1994). Actors involved in this collective activity can be placed both inside
and outside the new venture. Depending on the characteristic of the tie, an entrepreneur1
can enhance organizational trust or acquire additional resources. Regarding the rst
component Beckman (2006) and Davidsson and Honig (2003) show a positive relationship
between internal social capital, or the so-called bonding ties, and the performance of
start-ups, which is in line with the liability of newness and adolescence hypotheses, which
argue that the social relations are a determining factor in rm survival (Stinchcombe,
1965; Br uderl and Sch ussler, 1990).
Studies that treat entrepreneurship as a collective activity started to emerge in the late
1980s and early 1990; however, these studies revolve predominantly around the so-called
entrepreneurial or venturing founding team. This focus fails to recognize the important
role other employees might play in new ventures (Cardon and Stevens, 2004), both for
entrepreneurial teams and solo entrepreneurs. Earlier studies show that the availability
of human resources are important for organizations, as well as for new ventures (McPher-
son, 1983; Srensen, 2004). It can also be assumed that the relation among these human
resources inuences the eventual survival of start-ups.
This paper will take its point of departure in the collective perspective of entrepreneur-
ship and focus on the relations that exist within these start-ups. Here I specically
focus on the benets that arise due to a high degree of previous co-worker experience
in these start-ups, as suggested by Campbell (2005), to overcome the liability problems
1In this study, the terms entrepreneur and founder, and entrepreneurial and venture founding team
are used interchangeably.
1(e.g. liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liabilities of adolescence (Br uderl
and Sch ussler, 1990) that are associated with the social relations that exist within these
start-ups(Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001). The main research question formulated
in this paper is: What is the eect of previous co-worker experience on the survival of
new rms?
The availability of nationally linked employer-employee databases oers the possibility to
adopt a broader human resource perspective, including those in studies on entrepreneur-
ship. In this paper, I rely on the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Re-
search. From this database, I identify the founding of rms in Denmark and whether
these rms are able to survive in the following years. IDA is a longitudinal linked
employer-employee dataset which enables researchers to connect individuals to each of
these rms. In addition, it is possible to track the employment history of all individuals,
thus creating a measure of previous co-worker experience within these 3,043 start-ups.
The analyses show a signicant and positive eect of previous co-worker experience on
rm survival. However, there are clear dierences between entrepreneurial spin-os and
in other start-ups and if the relations is between founders, founders and employees or
among employees.
After this introduction, I will continue with the theoretical framework. This theoretical
framework will focus on the link between previous co-worker experience and rm survival
thereby building some testable hypotheses. In Section 3, I will describe the database,
sample selection, and the construction of the various variables used in the regression
analyses. Section 4 will present the descriptive statistics and the results of the regression
analysis. Lastly, the paper will outline some concluding remarks in Section 5 and Section
6.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Social Network, and Human Resource Formation
Before determining how former co-workers contribute to the survival of new ventures, it
is important to recognize how these and other human resources are mobilized to become
part of the new organization. In describing this human resource formation process,
2I will make a distinction between the formation of the entrepreneurial team and the
recruitment of employees; despite the fact that the motivations behind these dierent
types of human resource formation are similar.
Earlier studies on human resource dynamics in start-ups focus, as mentioned in the
introduction, on entrepreneurial or venture founding teams. This focus is one way to
incorporate a broader human resource perspective; however, this perspective might still
be too narrow since "the focus on the founder or founding team as the only source of
human capital fails to recognize the important role that other employees in the new
venture may play" (Cardon and Stevens, 2004, p. 296). Employees are, due to their
exibility and creativity, one of the most critical resources for an organization (Aldrich
and Ruef, 2006). Ruef et al. (2003) stated that: "Many entrepreneurs begin entirely on
their own, although they may turn to others for help with various aspects of the founding
process. Others begin with a team, making the enterprise a collective eort" (p. 195-
196). This is the reason why I look beyond the entrepreneurial or venture founding team
and include all the human resources (i.e. founders and employees).
The existence of an entrepreneurial team depends on the possibility and the desire to be
formed (Ruef et al., 2003), and its formation occurs predominantly prior to the start of
the new venture (Cooney, 2005). The motivation for adding individuals to form a team
are (i) the manifestation of interpersonal attraction and/or (ii) the complementarity
of skills and competences (Forbes et al., 2006). Furthermore, a large majority of the
entrepreneurial teams are based on social connections that existed before the start of
the entrepreneurial process (e.g. friends, family, and associates) (Vyakarman et al.,
1999).
Recruitment eorts for start-ups are often "unplanned, informal and (...) 'unimagi-
native' " (Barrett and Mayson, 2008, p. 120) with only a very few having established
recruitment methods (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Barrett and Mayson, 2008). Most start-
ups use a mix of formal and informal recruitment processes to attract employees (Aldrich
and Langton, 1998; Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). The formal recruitment process, which of-
ten leads to the recruitment of strangers, is commonly accompanied by high transaction
costs (Lin, 2001). First, new rms, just as other small rms, face the problem of lack of
organizational awareness (Williamson et al., 2002). Job seekers have to be notied of the
3existence of the new venture, and the creation of such awareness is costly. Second, there
is a high degree of uncertainty in recruiting strangers on both sides of the employment
relation. The employer is unaware of the competences of the new recruit and the new
recruit is unaware what the position will be like, since he or she will be the rst person
to hold this position (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006).
It is, however, the informal process that is the primary source for attracting new employ-
ees (Williamson and Robinson, 2008). This can be explained by the rather inexpensive
method and speed in which a person can be attracted. This is an advantage given the
lack of nancial and material resources that are available for this recruitment process.
The process is somewhat distinct because the channels by which recruitment takes place
were originally not intended for job market purposes (Marsden and Gorman, 2001). Such
an approach allows rms to increase their application horizon because they are able to
move more people into applying for the available position (Williamson and Robinson,
2008). Consequently, the quality of applicants might be higher because the person that
suggests an individual has knowledge on the possible t of the potential applicant. In
addition, the reputation of the person in the social network is dependent on the qual-
ity of the person they refer Aldrich and Ruef (2006); Williamson and Robinson (2008).
Individuals are eventually recruited because they, according to the founder and the al-
ready existing and trusted employees, posses the technical skills and experience needed
to accomplish the tasks, have a cultural t with the new organization, and/or have long
term potential (Baron et al., 1999).
Thus, the motives for forming an entrepreneurial team and recruiting new employees are
similar and both processes rely heavily on existing social networks. The individuals who
can be mobilized from a social network are dierent in the pre-founding relationship (e.g
family, friends, colleagues, and other acquaintances). The benets that can be expected
from these individuals might dier because the environment in which the social tie is
developed is put into a new context (e.g. a friend or family member becomes a colleague,
a former colleague changes organizational context, etc.). Therefore, it is important to
distinguish between the dierent pre-founding relationships, rather than making only a
distinction between the benets of recruiting a strong or a weak tie. It can be expected
that recruiting friends and family will have a dierent impact compared to recruiting
former co-workers, because the latter relationship is already embedded in a work context.
4In the following sections, the role of adding a former co-worker to the start-up is discussed
more in depth.
2.2 Internal Social Capital, Organizational Culture, and Selection Mech-
anisms
A widely accepted explanation on why new rms suer from high mortality rates is their
exposure to "liabilities of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965) or "liabilities of adolescence"
(Br uderl and Sch ussler, 1990). The liability of newness hypothesis argues in favor of an
age dependence of organizational mortality stating that the risk of death decreases with
age. Although these liabilities are broad, they fall back on the following four factors
that are linked to the social structures within these start-ups:
(a) New organizations, especially new types of organizations, generally in-
volve new roles, which have to be learned... (b) The process of inventing new
roles, the determination of their mutual relations and of structuring the eld
of rewards and sanctions so as to get the maximum performance, have high
costs in time, worry, conict, and temporary ineciency... (c) New organiza-
tions must rely heavily on social relations among strangers. This means that
relations of trust are much more precarious in new than old organizations...
(d) One of the main resources of old organizations is a set of stable ties to
those who use organizational services. Old customers know how to use the
services of the organization, have built their own social systems to use the
old products or to inuence the old type of government, are familiar with the
channels of ordering, with performance qualities of the product, with how the
price compares, and know the people they have to deal with... (Stinchcombe,
1965, p. 148-149).
Br uderl and Sch ussler (1990) shares the perspective that the early years of a rm are
more hazardous but argues that the risk of failure does not decrease directly after the
establishment of the start-up. Instead, it increases in the rst few months because of
their resource endowment and rational behavior. After a short period, normally after
the rst evaluation, the risk will decline due to the same mechanism as discussed in
5the liability of newness hypothesis. Although the timing between these dierent type of
liabilities is dierent, both approaches hold the view that the mortality rate of start-ups
is inuenced by: (i) the lack of an organizational culture (i.e. the high cost, worry,
conict and ineciency due to the invention of new roles), (ii) the lack of internal social
capital (i.e. relation among strangers and the resulting low level of trust), and (iii) the
lack of inter-organizational relationships (i.e. the ties to those who use organizational
services), where the rst two factors are closely connected to each other because they
both deal with personal relationships.
As explained in the previous section, start-ups rely on social networks in their recruit-
ment and entrepreneurial team formation process. This reliance can assist in overcoming
the lack of internal social capital and the lack of an organizational culture. Internal so-
cial capital, or bonding ties, are the relations that create a higher degree of cohesiveness
within the organization and accelerate the pursuit of collective goals, which fosters coop-
erative relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002). From the perspective of new rm creation,
intra-organizational bonding ties can only be present whenever a relationship already
existed prior to the recruitment or entrepreneurial team formation process. On top of
that, the presence of a social tie in the new rm already indicates a level of trust and
cohesiveness. There are, however, various types of direct and indirect pre-founding re-
lationships present in a social network (e.g. friends, family, friends of friends, former
colleagues, etc.). Each pre-founding relationship and associated level of trust is formed
in a particular context; a change of this context might have an eect on the trust and
cohesiveness in the new organization. To illustrate this, compare a non-work related
bonding tie (e.g. a friend) with a work-related bonding tie (e.g. a former colleague) and
both individuals move to a new rm. The context of the latter remains the same (i.e.
based on work) while the friend moves from a predominantly social context to a work
context; a context which is not familiar to both sides of the newly formed co-worker
relationship, and which most likely does not accelerate the pursuit of goals as quickly
compared to the collaboration with a former colleague.
This last point is related to the need of a strong organizational culture (Stinchcombe,
1965; Campbell, 2005), also for new and emerging organizations (Aldrich and Ruef,
2006) The problem is that new rms do not have such a culture because they lack (i)
the homogeneity and stability of group membership and (ii) the length and intensity
6of shared experiences within the organization (Schein, 1984). Be that as it may, the
fact that rms do not have a culture of their own does not mean it can, in the infancy
phase, build on the shared experiences that have been formed in another organizational
context. Involving former co-workers can lead to the creation of a strong culture and
improved eciency (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Campbell, 2005). Each indi-
vidual that enters the new start-up has internalized the organizational culture of the
rms to which they were connected to in the past (Meek, 1988). If multiple individuals
have the same previous rm experience, they bring the same organizational culture into
the organization, which might help to overcome any initial problem with eciency and
role determination. This transfer of organizational culture can be placed on the same
line with the spin-os literature and the transfer of organizational routines and resources
that inuence the survival and overall performance of spin-o (Baron et al., 1999; Burton
et al., 2002; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006).
Finally, previous interaction with former co-workers functions as a strong screening mech-
anism. Co-workers are exposed to each others' skills and competences on a daily basis.
In this position a person is able to judge whether these skills and competences are valu-
able for the new organization. If these skills did not prove to be valuable, the former
co-worker would not be asked to join the new venture; this would also be the case if it
were believed that the person did not t into the organizational culture. On the other
hand, these selection mechanisms can also work the other way from the potential recruit
to the new organization. A high degree of co-worker experience might also indicate and
inuence the co-worker of whether those that run the business have the competences and
capability of running a potential success business and putting together a good team.
Based on the above, I derive that the presence of previous co-worker experience would
benet the new start-up in three interconnected ways. First, there is the presence of
a bonding tie between the dierent co-workers in the new organization that leads to a
higher level of trust and a higher degree of cohesiveness. Second, the shared organiza-
tional context can create a stronger organizational culture because parts of the culture
that existed in the previous workplace will be transferred to the new start-up. This fa-
miliarity to the organizational culture will lead to more eciency and less conict, which
is an advantage for the rm to survive in the initial phase. Third, there is a selection
mechanism in attracting a former colleague into the organization. Based on the shared
7working experience it is possible to make a rst-hand judgment on whether individuals
possess the resources that are needed to fulll the task and whether this person will t
in the new rm. This results in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in the degree of previous co-worker experience
increases the likelihood of rm survival.
Hypothesis 1 focuses on the previous co-worker experience of all human resources in the
new venture. The specic role these human resources fulll (i.e. whether they are a
founder or an employee) is not taken into account. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that
founders are more committed to the start-up than employees. In addition, they are the
main decision makers.
Founders are shaped by their previous job positions, hence the notion of founders as
organizational products (Audia and Rider, 2006). These experiences have proven to
be inuential in determining the survival rate of start-ups because the routines gained
in the previous forms of employment are transferred to the new organization (Dahl and
Reichstein, 2006). In addition to transferring the routines, they also inuence the nature
of the organization (Huber, 1991), and determine the organizational culture within the
new rm (Schein, 1983, 1984; Bass and Avolio, 1994). Whenever previous co-worker
experience is present among the founders, this organizational culture is enhanced because
they can build on shared experiences. On top of that, the fact that former co-workers
decide to start up a business together indicates a high level of trust and reliance on each
other's competences (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).
The role of the employees should, however, not be overlooked. Founders are responsible
for the recruitment of employees. By recruiting employees from previous workplaces the
founder (i) increases the likelihood of recruiting a person that will t in the organizational
culture of the start-up, and (ii) had the opportunity to identify whether the skills this
person has are suitable for the task this person is hired for. These perspectives lead to
the formulation of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Previous co-worker experience among and with the founder is
8more important than previous co-worker experience among the employees.
In addition to the internal social capital and the need of an organizational culture, there
was a third liability (i.e. lack of inter-organizational relationships). To overcome this
liability problem, a start-up needs to possess industry specic knowledge (e.g. customer
demand, products, technologies, suppliers and competition) (Cooper et al., 1994). A high
degree of this knowledge will positively inuence the surviving chances of the start-up.
However, in the previous hypotheses I argue for a stronger eect of previous co-worker
experience whenever the founder is involved in this relationship. For this reason, it
should be considered whether there is a dierence in the role of this previous co-worker
experience, especially when the founder has experience in the same industry (i.e. if the
start-up is an entrepreneurial spin-o) (Klepper, 2001; Helnat and Lieberman, 2002; Dahl
et al., 2003). Earlier studies have already shown that this industry-specic experience
of founders has a strong inuence on the survival of rms (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper
and Sleeper, 2005; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006). An entrepreneurial spin-o can build on
the existing external relationships and will form a balance on the lack of internal social
capital and organizational culture. For this reason, I hypothesize that entrepreneurial
spin-os rely less on previous co-worker experience than other types of start-ups.
Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurial spin-os rely more on founder experience, and
previous co-worker experience will have less inuence on the likelihood of rm
survival compared to other start-ups.
In the previous three hypotheses, I argued solely in favor for involving former co-workers
into the organization. Despite these benets, there might be "too much of a good
thing", where a large degree of previous co-worker experience will be negative as a result
of organizational inertia. I focus here on the structural inertia that arises as a result of
high levels of previous co-worker experience. These inertia pressures will put constraints
on the adaptive capabilities needed to solve problems of complexity encountered by these
new rms. Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984) list dierent types of internal and external
inertia pressures. Despite the fact that these inertia pressures are discussed in relation
to organizational change they can also be applied in connection to new venture creation.
9A new venture with a high degree of previous co-worker experience has strong roots with
the previous organization and can therefore be treated as a special form of organizational
change. Because I focus on the internal factors that inuence the survival of the rm, I
will elaborate on these internal inertia pressures: (i) sunk costs in plant, equipment and
personnel, (ii) information constraints, (iii) the dynamics of political coalitions, and (iv)
the tendency for precedents to become normative standards. 2
Of most concern are inertia pressures two and four; even more so because they are inter-
twined. The fourth inertia, related to the tendency for precedents to become normative
standards, will have an additional impact on the information constraints. If a start-up
has a high degree of previous co-worker experience, the information will predominantly
build on the information and contacts that were present in the previous organization,
which constrains the search for opportunities (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006, p.78). That is
why Adler and Kwon (2002) argues for the importance of both bonding and bridging
ties, where bridging ties provide access to unique knowledge and contacts (Beckman,
2006); and resources that otherwise would not be available to the rm (McEvily and
Zaheer, 1999). As indicated earlier, one motivation for recruiting new employees into
the start-up is to integrate diverse knowledge that the organization lacks (Song et al.,
2003). A high degree of previous co-worker experience would result in a lack of structural
holes due to the strong tie nature of these contacts, which results in less new knowledge
entering the start-up (Burt, 1992).
Hypothesis 4: Large levels of previous co-worker experience will hamper the
survival of new rms
2I consider the inertia pressures related to the sunk cost in plants, equipment and personnel and the
dynamics of political coalition of least concern due to the selection mechanism in taking over equipment
and the recruitment of new members. Equipment that does not represent any value for the organization
will not be transferred to a new organization. Individuals who appeared to be of no value to the
organization will not be recruited in the new ventures and the same would be valid for members who
might cause problems because of a change in the political equilibria. At least there is no reason to assume
that there is a higher risk that this occurs compared to the recruitment of other prospective employees.
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3.1 Data
In order to investigate the formulated hypotheses, I rely on the Danish Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research (from now on referred to by its Danish acronym
IDA). IDA is a longitudinal and universal linked employer-employee database con-
structed from government registers and maintained by Statistics Denmark (DST). This
database contains detailed information on all individuals and all establishment in Den-
mark from 1980 onwards. Each individual and establishment has a unique identication
number, which makes it possible to study rm dynamics (founding, growth and disband-
ing of rm) and the employment history of the labor force. These features make the
database suitable for the analyses in this paper. On top of that, it is possible to identify
personal (e.g. education and work experience) and rm characteristics, (e.g. number of
employees, industry, ownership type and location). Given this structure, I can identify
who worked at which establishment at any given year since 1980, which facilitates the
identication of previous co-worker experience.
3.2 Start-ups, Founders and Entrepreneurial Spin-os
For this analysis, I created a sample on all start-ups in the year 2000, excluding those
start-ups that are active in the primary and public sector. The motivation for selecting
this particular year is two-fold. First, I want to be able to identify co-worker experience
over a long period of time; and where industry experience is an important controlling
factor in the analyses. The accuracy in measuring industry experiences decreases before
1992 due to a break in the industry classication code. Second, I want to follow the rm
for a number of years after founding to identify whether they survive. By choosing the
year 2000, I have eight years to identify relevant industry experience and ve years to
identify rm survival. The founding year is conrmed by using information on the rm's
founding date in combination with the establishment and rm identication number. A
start-up is thus identied as a rm with no prior rm identication number that consists
out of establishments with no previous establishment identication number (Dahl and
Reichstein, 2007). I make use of the European NACE industry codes to exclude all
start-ups active in the primary and public sector. All those establishments that are not
11within the 15 and 75 two-digit level NACE code are excluded. Within these two digit
codes there is one classication, 40 to 45 (energy), which is a mix of both public and
private rms. Start-ups active in this industry range are also omitted from the sample. I
will use the ownership code to remove those start-ups that are considered owned by the
public sector or are aliated to a foreign rm. Finally, I will impose a lower and upper
size limit on the start-ups in the sample. It requires at least two individuals to create
a connection based on previous co-worker experience. One-employee start-ups would
create an estimation bias; for this reason, I put a lower limit size of two individuals.
With the above-mentioned sample criteria in place, I have a small number of large start-
ups (some with several hundred employees); because these are most likely an error in
the data. I set an upper size limit of 25 individuals in the rst year, which includes 98
percent of all the start-ups that fullled all the other requirements. By incorporating
this nal requirement, I end up with a sample of 3,034 new founded rms.
For each start-up, I identied the founder or founding team by using the occupational
classication scheme of Statistics Denmark. A similar method has been used previously
by Nanda and Srensen (2009) and (Dahl and Reichstein, 2006) on the same database.
The structure of the database does not allow me to clearly identify founders. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to single out managers and owners. Here I ague, in line with Dahl
and Reichstein (2006), that the vast majority of Danish rms are likely to be managed
by their founders. The selection of these founders will depend on the type of ownership.
In the case of sole proprietorship and ordinary partnerships a founder is identied as a
person that is either identied as an owner or a high ranked manager. If no identication
can be made on these criteria, I identify the highest paid individual as the founder of
the rm. For corporate ventures, I use a similar founder identication method with the
exception of ventures that have three or less employees; in which case, I consider all
individuals part of the founding team.
The work history of the founders will be used to determine whether the start-up was
founded by a person who had industry specic know-how (i.e. is an entrepreneurial
spin-o). Dahl and Reichstein (2006) identies, by using the same database, an entre-
preneurial spin-o as a start-up with at least two founders coming from the same rm
within the same four-digit NACE industry class. I will follow a broader denition of such
a spin-o due to (i) the small size of most start-ups, (ii) the low number of founders, and
12(iii) the co-worker tie that is already present in this denition. In this paper, an entre-
preneurial spin-o is a rm founded by at least one founder who has worked in the same
four-digit NACE industry classication in at least one of their last three establishments.
Within the sample, I identied 1,420 entrepreneurial spin-os.
3.3 Variables
Dependent variable: The dependent variable is rm survival, not only for the year of
founding but also for each consecutive year up to 2005. Firms might in reality re-enter
into the same or in dierent industries; however, for analytical purposes I will treat these
rms as non-survivors. Subsequently, these rms will not re-appear in the sample. Due
to the structure of the database, I can only identify the year in which the start-up fails.
For this reason, I will use a logistic regression to test the likelihood of survival, thereby
creating a binary value rm survival. Table 1 shows the structure of the dataset and it
shows that one rm might have more than one observation depending on the number of
years it is able to survive. In total the sample consists of 10,540 rm year observations.
Table 1: Structure of the Dataset
FIRM ID YEAR SURVIVE AGE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
2000-1 2000 1 1 ...
2000-1 2001 1 2 ...
2000-1 2002 1 3 ...
2000-1 2003 0 4 ...
2000-2 2000 1 1 ...
2000-2 2001 0 2 ...
2000-3 2000 1 1 ...
2000-3 2001 1 2 ...
2000-3 2002 1 3 ...
2000-3 2003 1 4 ...
2000-3 2004 1 5 ...
2000-4 2000 0 1 ...
Independent Variables: The core variables are those that indicate the degree of previous
co-worker experience. This previous co-worker experience is measured on all the human
resources that are present in the rst and second year. The motivation for choosing
the human resources in the rst two years is: (i) the observation that most rms start
small and hardly change in size during their lifetime (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006); (ii) the
initial resource prole can be used to predict start-up performance, including failure
13(Cooper et al., 1994); and (iii) early hiring decisions have lasting consequences for new
organizations (Baron et al., 1999). As IDA uses unique personal identication numbers,
I can avoid double counting.
To create these variables, I selected the three most recent establishments in which each
individual was active before joining this new venture. Some individuals are not regis-
tered to have had any work experience, either because they were new to the Danish
labor market or experienced a long spell of unemployment. In total I created four dif-
ferent previous co-worker experience variables. The rst variable measures the degree
of previous co-worker experience based on all individuals (i.e. founders and employees)
who are associated with the new venture in the rst two years. This variable, termed






Ci= Concentration of employees with a previous co-worker relationship in the new rm.
sij= Share of individuals who can be associated to rm i and share a with at least one individual
that previously worked rm j.
n= Those shares where two or more current employees share the same previous workplace.
In order to calculate this measure, I identied those individuals who share a common
establishments based on the last three establishments in which they were active. Here I
need to stress the fact that around 80 percent of all ties are identied based on the most
recent establishment. In addition, it is important to recognize that two individuals can
share the same establishment even though they did not work at this establishment at
the same time. Afterwards, I measure the share of all individuals who worked in each of
the previous establishments and take the square value of each share to assign a higher
value to larger groups in the rm. Contrary to a more ordinary concentration measure
(e.g. Herndahl-Hirschman Index) the square values of individuals who do not share a
previous establishment with another individual will not be added. The reason for doing
so is that a relationship exists between at least two individuals. To further illustrate
14this, imagine a rm with ve individuals where two individuals share the same previous
workplace. In this situation Ci will have a value of 0.16. If this same rm consisted of
ten individuals but still with two from the same workplace, Ci would drop to 0.04. If no
individuals share the same previous rm this value would drop to zero.
To disentangle the eect of knowing the founder or knowing other co-workers, I introduce
the variable termed know foundempl. This variable indicates the share of employees who
had a previous co-worker relationship with at least one of the founders. For calculating
the degree of previous co-worker experience among the employees, know employee, and
founders, know founder, I use the same measure as presented to calculate know all.
Control Variables: In addition to the above-mentioned explanatory variables, I need to
control other for factors that explain dierences in rm survival. The usual predictors
are: size, age, type of ownership, location, and industry. As a measure of size, I take the
logarithmic value of the number of employees that are present in the rst and second year
of founding. The age variable is a categorical variable indicating the age of the start-up
in number of years. In addition to size and age I will also, as suggested by (Br uderl
and Sch ussler, 1990), control for the type of ownership being either sole proprietorship,
general partnership or a limited partnership. A dummy variable is created for each of
these dierent ownership types. Another variable to control for is whether the new rm
is located in the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area (CMA). Start-ups located in this area
face stronger competition compared to those located in other parts of the country. Such
a variable has also been used in previous studies (Br uderl and Sch ussler, 1990; Eriksson
and Kuhn, 2006; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006). The last variable to control for is industry.
To do so, I include non-reported xed eects variables on the two-digit NACE industry
code, which will capture a large degree of unobserved heterogeneity among start-ups.
Those industries that have only one observation will be assigned to the two-digit industry
class to which they are most similar.
In addition to the above-mentioned overall rm characteristic, I also correct for human
capital characteristics of the initial human resource composition. Even though a rm
is subject to these characteristics changing due to the arrival and departure of employ-
ees, the initial composition has proven to be a good estimator for future performance
(Cooper et al., 1994). First, I create a variable indicating the share of individuals with
15an academic degree as earlier studies have identied that education has a positive eect
on performance. Second, the average number of years of total work experience (average
number of years an individual has been present in the database since 1980). Third,
tenure in the previous rm (average number of years an individual has been registered
as employee of the previous rm). Fourth average year of work experience in the same
four-digit NACE industry class. The last variable will indicate the share of individuals
who in at least one their last three establishments, worked in the same four-digit NACE
industry class as the start-up.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the survival of all the start-ups in the sample. The rst year, 81.95
percent of start-ups survive, but this number decreases to 64.92 percent in the second,
53.06 percent in the third, and 46.52 percent in the fourth year. At the end of the
observation period, in total 1,249 of the start-ups are still present, which accounts for
just over 41 percent of all initial start-ups.
In addition to the general survival patterns, rm survival is presented by looking at
larger industry classes. This illustrates once more, dierences on the level of industry
and hence the need to control for this factor in the analyses, however, a more detailed
industry classication will be used to capture this heterogeneity. Most new rms are
Table 2: Survival Rate by Year and Industry
Year Industry
TOTAL MANU. CONSTR. WHOLESALE & HOTEL & TRANS. FIN. & BUS.
RETAIL REST. SERV.
No. start-ups 3,043 216 437 810 604 176 800
2001 81.95% 87.96% 83.98% 83.95% 71.69% 88.07% 83.50%
2002 64.92% 73.15% 67.51% 67.65% 51.99% 72.16% 66.63%
2003 53.06% 61.57% 56.06% 56.79% 39.90% 63.07% 53.00%
2004 46.52% 55.09% 50.11% 48.52% 33.11% 57.39% 47.88%
2005 41.06% 49.07% 46.45% 43.08% 26.82% 50.56% 42.50%
rms in 2005 1,249 106 203 349 162 89 340
16founded in Wholesale & Retail followed by Financial & Business Services. The least
number of start-ups occur in the transport sector, most likely due to higher costs of
entry. This industry also experiences the highest survival rate, 50.56 percent of start-
ups are able to survive the ve-year period. The sector that has the highest failure rate
is, not surprisingly, Hotel & Restaurant with a survival rate of 26.82 percent. It is also





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18In Table 3, I present an overview of the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
regression analysis, including the correlation matrix. Bear in mind that the averages and
standard errors are calculated based on the 10,540 yearly observations. The correlations
between the variables are highly signicant. The collinearity is high between know all
on the one hand and know founder, know foundempl, and know employee on the other.
Because these are substitute variables in separate regression models this collinearity is
expected. In total, 50 percent of all start-ups (1,522) experience some degree of previous
co-worker experience. Most co-worker experience is found among the entrepreneurial
spin-os (i.e. just over 56 percent).
4.2 Regression Results
The results of the logistic regressions using industry xed eects are summarized in Table
4 and Table 5. Please note that survival has the value one and death the value zero
when interpreting the eects of each variable. A positive sign thus indicates a positive
eect on the likelihood of survival.
Model A1 shows the outcome of a logistic regression analysis including the control vari-
ables and the co-worker experience variable know all. After correcting for the usual
predictors of rm survival, the analysis shows a signicant and positive eect of previ-
ous co-worker experience on the likelihood of rm survival. When considering the other
employee characteristic variables, a strong eect is visible for the experience variables
where tenure in the same industry has a positive eect on rm survival. This indicates
the importance on the presence of industry-specic know-how. The other experience
variables are also strongly signicant indicating that overall experience has a positive
impact on the likelihood of rm survival. Finally, education appears to have a signif-
icant and positive eect on the likelihood of rm survival; however, this eect is only
signicant on the ten percent level.
In Model A2, I make a distinction between founders and employees by substituting know
all with know founder, know foundempl, and know employee. This allows me to deter-
mine if there is a dierent eect when comparing founder-founder, employee-founder, and
employee- employee ties. The outcome shows a positive and signicant eect regarding
the share of employees who worked previously with one of the founders on the likelihood
19Table 4: Summary of the Regression Analyses
MODEL A1 MODEL A2 MODEL A3 MODEL A4
spin-o other start-up
Variable Estimate S.E Estimate S.E Estimate S.E Estimate S.E
Intercept -0.658 *** 0.167 -0.629 *** 0.169 -0.728 ** 0.295 -0.901 *** 0.223
year 5 0.234 *** 0.072 0.233 *** 0.072 0.211 ** 0.104 0.233 ** 0.103
year 4 0.203 *** 0.067 0.203 *** 0.067 0.107 0.095 0.283 *** 0.098
year 3 -0.214 *** 0.055 -0.213 *** 0.055 -0.179 ** 0.081 -0.246 *** 0.077
year 2 -0.290 *** 0.049 -0.289 *** 0.050 -0.236 *** 0.074 -0.331 *** 0.069
year 1 benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark
log(size) 0.521 *** 0.044 0.498 *** 0.045 0.451 *** 0.068 0.560 *** 0.074
CMA -0.018 0.057 -0.020 0.057 -0.005 0.086 -0.050 0.079
limited partnership 0.328 *** 0.053 0.331 *** 0.053 0.270 *** 0.080 0.401 *** 0.074
general partnership -0.144 * 0.078 -0.161 ** 0.079 -0.080 0.118 -0.244 ** 0.108
sole proprietorship benchmark benchmark benchmark benchmark
know all 0.245 ** 0.104
know founder 0.185 ** 0.093 0.044 0.125 0.362 ** 0.146
know foundempl 0.206 * 0.112 0.181 0.148 0.279 0.179
know employee 0.004 0.163 0.074 0.248 -0.127 0.229
share of higher educated 0.284 * 0.164 0.275 * 0.165 0.681 ** 0.307 0.136 0.204
tenure in previous rm 0.066 *** 0.017 0.067 *** 0.017 0.051 * 0.027 0.067 *** 0.023
total work experience 0.062 *** 0.010 0.062 *** 0.010 0.040 ** 0.015 0.083 *** 0.013
total industry experience 0.122 *** 0.026 0.122 *** 0.026 0.148 *** 0.035 0.084 * 0.044
share from same industry 0.365 ** 0.141 0.367 ** 0.144 0.487 ** 0.247 0.734 *** 0.274
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
N 10,540 10,540 5,202 5,338
Likelihood ratio 782.007*** 786.399*** 289.597*** 496.711***
*** Signicant at the 1% level
** Signicant at the 5% level
*Signicant at the 10% level
of rm survival. However, there is also a positive eect visible on the co-worker expe-
rience among the founders, which also shows a stronger level of signicance. Previous
co-worker experience among employees does not have any eect on the likelihood of rm
survival. The remaining variables do not dier from those reported in Model 1.
Since I expect a dierent eect between entrepreneurial spin-os and other type of start-
ups, I undertook two separate analyses on these rm characteristics. Model A3 presents
the results for entrepreneurial spin-os and Model A4 shows the eects of previous co-
worker experience on other start-ups. The two models show distinctive dierences in
the eect of previous co-worker experience on rm survival. Model 3 cannot present any
signicant eect of previous co-worker experience. The remaining variables all have a
positive eect on the likelihood of rm survival. In Model 4, the results are dierent.
The previous co-worker experience among founders has a signicant positive eect on
20the likelihood of rm survival, while the other ties do not show any signicant signs.
For both entrepreneurial spin-os and other start-ups the presence of individuals with
experience in the same industry is important, while the length is stronger and more
signicant for spin-os. Other overall experiences seem to have a stronger and more
signicant eect on other start-ups.
In Table 5 I present three models (i.e. Model B1, Model B2, and Model B3) that test
the impact of a large degree of previous co-worker experience. This is done by testing
whether there is a curvilinear relationship between previous co-worker experience and
rm survival. There turns out to be a high degree of multicollinearity on these core
variables, with the exception of know all, which cannot be solved by normalization.
However, based on the know all variable and the square value of this variable I can test for
the presence of a curvilinear eect. Overall, the model suggests that there is a curvilinear
eect of previous co-worker experience on the likelihood of rm survival, however, the
negative eect is visible for those start-ups where previous co-worker experience is close
to the maximum value. In Model B2 there appears to be no signicant eect of previous
co-worker experience, which was already shown in Model A3. Model B3 shows, just as
Model B1, that previous co-worker experience has a curvilinear eect on the survival of
start-ups.
5 The Eects of Previous Co-Worker Experience on Firm
Survival
In this paper, I analyzed the eect of previous co-worker experience on the survival of
3,043 new established Danish rms. The argument behind the expected importance of
this experience is on the one hand, the need for cohesion and an organizational culture
to tackle the liabilities faced by start-ups, and on the other hand, is the opportunity
for previous colleagues to screen each others competences and skills to the needs of
the new start-up. However, I also expect that too much of this previous co-worker
experience will lead to organizational inertia; consequently hampering the organization
in the search for alternative opportunities to solve complex problems. Based on these
theoretical considerations, four hypotheses have been formalized.
21Table 5: Summary of the Regression Analyses on Curvilinear Eects
MODEL B1 MODEL B2 MODEL B3
spin-o other start-up
Variable Estimate S.E Estimate S.E Estimate S.E
Intercept -0.498 *** 0.178 -0.732 ** 0.309 -0.672 *** 0.229
year 5 0.233 *** 0.072 0.213 ** 0.104 0.232 ** 0.101
year 4 0.202 *** 0.067 0.108 0.095 0.282 *** 0.096
year 3 -0.214 *** 0.055 -0.180 ** 0.081 -0.248 *** 0.076
year 2 -0.289 *** 0.050 -0.237 *** 0.074 -0.331 *** 0.067
year 1 benchmark benchmark benchmark
log(size) 0.493 *** 0.046 0.456 *** 0.068 0.543 *** 0.067
CMA -0.016 0.057 -0.013 0.086 -0.040 0.078
limited partnership 0.332 *** 0.053 0.264 *** 0.080 0.407 *** 0.073
general partnership -0.150 * 0.078 -0.078 0.117 -0.226 ** 0.107
sole proprietorship benchmark benchmark benchmark
know all 0.171 *** 0.058 0.063 0.082 0.267 *** 0.086
(know all)2 -0.058 ** 0.029 -0.042 0.038 -0.082 * 0.046
share of higher educated 0.281 * 0.164 0.683 ** 0.305 0.132 0.200
tenure in previous rm 0.066 *** 0.017 0.056 ** 0.027 0.064 *** 0.023
total work experience 0.061 *** 0.010 0.043 *** 0.015 0.080 *** 0.013
total industry experience 0.124 *** 0.026 0.144 *** 0.035 0.091 ** 0.044
share from same industry 0.354 ** 0.144 0.558 ** 0.251 0.682 ** 0.270
industry dummies yes yes yes
N 10,540 5,202 5,338
Likelihood ratio 786.007*** 288.531*** 497.705***
*** Signicant at the 1% level
** Signicant at the 5% level
*Signicant at the 10% level
Hypothesis 1, which argues in favor of previous co-worker experience on the likelihood of
rm survival, is supported. Previous co-worker experience appears to have explanatory
power in the survival of new ventures. Adding former co-workers to the organization
seems to be a fruitful strategy to overcome a rm's liability of newness, as suggested
by Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990); Schoonhoven and Romanelli (2001); Campbell
(2005). Whether this is because these co-workers bring in the required internal social
capital, organizational culture, or competences cannot, however, be identied. In addi-
tion, co-worker experience is based on the last three establishments before the person
joined the new venture, which means that (i) members do not have to be present during
the same time period and (ii) members who were never in contact with each other. Nev-
ertheless, the likelihood that those individuals who shared a previous workplace without
having known each other in this previous workplace is rather low, especially since 80
percent of all relations were based on the most recent establishment. Even if they did
not work together they still have internalized the previous rm's organizational culture
22(Meek, 1988).
Hypothesis 2 takes the rst hypothesis as a point of departure but puts emphasis on the
importance of the founder as the main decision-maker and the person that determines
the organizational culture in the new rm. The results, which are presented in Model 2,
support the hypothesis that previous co-worker experience with and among founders is
more important in explaining the likelihood of rm survival. The founder should be part
of the previous co-worker relationship in order to have an eect on the survival of new
ventures. However, the employees are also a crucial component. This would support the
argument that founders are not the only contributing factor to the success and failure
of new ventures (Katz et al., 2000; Cardon and Stevens, 2004) and that there is a need
for broadening the scope by including all human resources of the new organization. One
potential problem that I encountered was whether the persons whom I identied as
being part of the founding team are indeed the founders of the start-up. It might be
that the founding team is larger or smaller, nevertheless, the founding team is based
mostly on those who are identied as top managers and owners of the start-up. This
means that previous co-worker experience in this group is positive. In addition, even if I
over-estimated the size of the team or identied the wrong individuals as founding team
members, there is still a strong eect on overall previous co-worker experience.
Hypothesis 3 makes a distinction between entrepreneurial spin-os and other start-ups
and states that entrepreneurial spin-os predominantly benet from industry-specic
knowledge lowering the impact of previous co-worker experience. This hypothesis is
supported since entrepreneurial spin-os do not seem to benet from previous co-worker
experience. They benet more from the fact that founders have experience in the same
industry, which partly solves the inter-organizational liability problem, and the length
of this industry experience has a strong signicant and positive eect on the likelihood
of rm survival. Other start-ups seem to benet from the previous co-worker experience
that existed among the entrepreneurial team, although the same disclaimer would apply
as described in the previous paragraph regarding the selection of these founders. Because
these start-ups lack these inter-organizational competences among the founders, they
deal with the high level of uncertainty by creating an organization that is built on trust
and cohesion. Furthermore, the overall work experience and the experience in the last
rm has a stronger eect in these ordinary start-ups compared to entrepreneurial spin-
23os. This can also be interpreted as the intensity of previous co-worker experience since
most of the former co-worker relationships are based on the last establishment in which
they were active.
The last hypothesis nds minor support in the results of the regression analysis. There
appears to be a marginal decreasing eect of previous co-worker experience where close
to maximum values show a negative eect . Thus, a high degree of previous co-worker
experience leads to some degree of inertia and hampers the organizations in their search
for opportunities (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). This also supports the argument that there is
a need for both bonding and bridging ties in the organization, where bridging ties provide
the start-up with new sources of information (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). However,
when splitting up the sample into entrepreneurial spin-os and other start-ups, this
curvilinear eect is only visible for other start-ups, which was to be expected given the
non-signicant eect of previous co-worker experience found while testing for Hypothesis
3. As it was shown, other start-ups can overcome their problem of liability by working
together with former colleagues, which can enhance the level of trust and cohesion or
simply enable the selection of better competences. Nevertheless, too much previous co-
worker experience creates an environment where too much of the same organizational
culture and competences are applied in a completely dierent industry. This can lead to
too much reliance on established routines which in turn can make a rm inexible and
slow to adapt and survive when there are changes in an unknown industry and/or the
market.
6 Discussion
New ventures face a list of challenges, all related to what is called liability of new-
ness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liability of adolescence (Br uderl and Sch ussler, 1990).
Both these liabilities lie in the social domain of these ventures (e.g., personal and inter-
organizational relationships). In addition, new ventures also face challenges in the re-
cruitment process (Williamson et al., 2002), which results in a strong reliance on informal
recruitment methods. This process might, besides the speed and costs, reduce the liabil-
ity problem since it leads to the recruitment of individuals who have a relationship with
the founder and trusted employees. Consequently, the internal social capital in these
24ventures can be improved. Furthermore, if these new recruits are former co-workers,
these relationships can build on a strong bonding tie and bring established organiza-
tional cultures into an environment where this culture is crucial (Campbell, 2005). Up
to now, I identied a few studies that address this issue of shared aliation within new
ventures, Beckman (2006); Beckman et al. (2007), but no studies have been found that
include all human resources (i.e., founders and employees) into the analysis.
This study, based on a sample of 3,043 newly founded rms in the Danish economy,
provided some micro level evidence on the importance of previous co-worker experi-
ence. This is consistent with what one would expect when looking at the theory on
how these shared experiences would aect the survival of new ventures (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1990; Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001; Campbell, 2005). Thereby
controlling the usual predictors of rm survival (e.g., industry, location, average age,
education, and work experience), there is a clear indication that this previous co-worker
experience has a signicant and positive eect on the likelihood of rm survival, es-
pecially for those start-ups that cannot build on established routines within the same
industry. This eect is mostly ascribed to the situation in which the founder is part
of this previous co-worker experience between founders and employees, indicating the
importance of founders in the process that determines the direction of the new organiza-
tion. The results do not only show the importance of previous co-worker experience, but
also provide minor support that there are inertia pressures as a result of a high degree of
previous co-worker experience. Hannan and Freeman (1977) addresses this problem for
the adaptive capability of organizations. These problems appear to be valid only for nor-
mal start-ups since they will be hampered by the inertia pressures that predominantly
rest on the routines in a completely dierent industry.
Although the results show a signicant and positive eect there is denitely more room
for future research. In this paper, I focused on co-workers since the data only allows
me to look at this specic role. This analyses could be expanded by identifying more
precisely what the underlying mechanism were for mobilizing the co-worker in the new
venture (i.e., internal social capital, organizational culture, selection of the competences
and skills required), and if there is a dierence in how these motives aect new venture
performance. More qualitative approaches can identify what the real motivation is for
starting up with former colleagues. Especially because many of these former colleagues
25will leave a secure job position to work in an uncertain environment. Furthermore,
it would be interesting to look at other specic roles within the strong and weak ties
dichotomy (i.e., family, friends, including the eect of strangers); it is the interaction
between all these individuals that determine rm survival. This interaction most likely
varies in dierent types of start-ups and across dierent industries. Other studies on
human resource formation in entrepreneurship have shown that there is a tendency to
create homogeneous teams, but the impact of such a composition has only recently
become an area of interest. Some studies argue for the benets of being diverse while
others argue that diversity leads to conict. The accessibility to the current linked
employer-employee databases oers the possibility to test, and in the process challenge,
these viewpoints.
Finally, I would like to stress the importance on the issue raised by Katz et al. (2000) and
Cardon and Stevens (2004) to not forget the importance of employees in the analyses
and the impact that human resources may have on start-up performances. The access
to linked employer-employee databases provide researchers with a powerful tool to look
beyond the founders. Founders are a small part of a small organizational setting and it
is the interaction between all the members that eventually determine the performance
of new ventures.
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